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IINTRODUCTION
On the average about two hundred odd cases are decided and
reported by the Interstate Commerce Commission every year, to say
nothing of the hundreds of claims and complaints which are in-
formally disposed of and not reported upon. The reported cases
involve all kinds of railway matters from the least to the most
important. As was said by Professor Meyer in 1910, ^- and it is
today that
still more true to say/ "There is hardly anything available at
the present time, offering to the public a more varied, more
widely distributed, and a more concrete and a better authenticated
collection of facts relating to railways in the United States
than the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission".
An attempt is made in this thesis to classify all the cases
reported, 2 between the passage of the Hepburn and Mann-Blkins Acts,
dated June 29, 1906, and June 18, 1910 respectively, according
to the nature of the subject matters involved therein. As a
result of this classification, the writer expects to gain some
insight into the involved questions of reasonableness of railroad
rates, and of the legality of various practices of the carriers,
at the same time securing a bird's eye view of the intricate rail-
way situation in the United States from both the legal and
industrial angle
.
A considerable length of time was consumed in gathering
the Commission case sheets, putting them in order according to
1
"Railway Legislation in the United States".
2 Actually the first of the cases treated dates January,
1907, there being no cases reported during the later part
of 1906.
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pagination, and filing them under the index classification used
by Commission in its Annual Reports. This preliminary step was
necessary for our ultimate purpose of studying and analyzing
the cases. It would have been scare cely possible to study and
analyze thi3 mass of confused facts without arranging them at
first in a handy, working shape
,
It may be well to mention here that the classification of
the Commission's cases adopted herein is not altogether an inno-
vation of the writer. Professor Hammond in his essay, first
published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1910 and re-
printed in book form in 1911, under the title of "Railway Rate
Theories of the Interstate Commerce Commission", made a survey
vear
of a large number of cases decided between 1887, the first/ of the
Commission, and 1906, the year of the passage of the Hepburn
Amendment. As the title of his essay indicates, the work of
Professor Hammond was, however, confined tc those cases which
apparently involved the principles of rate making; while the classi-
of the writer
f icat ion/comprises all cases reported by the Commission during
the subsequent period of about four years.
In commencing the work of classification, the writer separat-
ed the cases into as many classes as there were matters involved.
The index to points decided by the Commission given in the annual
reports was made the basis of this preliminary grouping. When
all the cases, numbering about 800 altogether, were classified
and filed under their proper headings, they were reclassified by
consolidating together those cases which involved matters of
kindred nature into a larger class, the constituent classes being

Ill
entered as sub-classes. Gradually, this grouping was reduced
down to the shape in which it now appears in this thesis.
was completed
After the final classification/a more detailed study of the
cases was made for the purpose of ascertaining the general atti-
tude of the Commission by a review of the decisions.
This review was necessarily somewhat cursory in nature as the
greater part of time of the writer was consumed in evolving a
type of classification that would logically and satisfactorily
take care of the various points in controversy.

1CHAPTER I
CLASSIFICATION
I
Factors determining the reasonableness of rate.
1. Distance
a. Differentials
b. Export rates
c. Import rates
d. Group rates and advantage of location
e. Long and short haul section and competition.
2. Cost of Service
a. Marine insurance
b. Profit or earning
c. Released rates
d. Weight
3. Value
a. Of service
b. Of commodity
II
Services and Privileges
A. To Shippers:
1. Compression in transit
2. Feeding in transit
3. Milling in transit
4. Stoppage in transit
5. Lightering

6. Track - Storage
7. Unloading cars
8. Telegraph service
9. Re consignment privilege
To Passengers :
1. Free passes
2. Party rates
III
Improper Practices of Carriers
1. Extra allowances
2. Embargoes
3. Rebate
4. Under charges
5. Misstatement of agent
6. Pooling of freight
IV
Equipment of Facilities
1. Car suppliers
2 . Car shortage
3. Elevation
4. Stations
5. Terminal
6. Switches

3V
Interline Relations
1. Combination rate
2. Joint rates
3. Propotioned rates
4. Division of rates
VI
Jurisdiction of Commission
1. Jurisdiction over Alaska
2. State railroad commission
3; Tap line
4. Terminal company
5. Regulation of services of carriers
6. Establishment of stations
7. Fixing basis for division of rates
Note
The above classification is a result of repeated refining.
The writer has already briefly referred to in the introduction the
method used in constructing the classification. Each general
heading as appeared in the classification will be given a chapter
in the subsequent part of the thesis, beginning with a statement
of its general feature, then followed by a more detailed dis-
cussion of each of the subheadings by occasional quoting of
actual cases for the purpose of illustration. The same treatment
prevails throughout the thesis.

4CHAPTER II
Factors determining the reasonableness of rates.
The complicated situation of railroads in the United States
makes the rate problem an exceedingly difficult one. As a public
calling, the railroads are not in a position to charge rates
"what the traffic will bear"; and on the other hand, railroads
are private enterprises, and have to charge rates so as to yield
enough profit to make the business worthy of investment. Public
exaggerates the one, and railroads, the other. The question
"What is a reasonable rate" must then be decided by neither of
the body, but by a body disinterested and unbiased in, and at
the same time, conversant with the question. For this very
demand, the Interstate Commerce Commission was instituted in
1887, and its power over rates was enlarged by the Act of 1906.
and again of 1910.
In passing judgements upon the reasonableness of rates,
the Commission was, however, rather at a loss at the beginning
years
to find a proper basis for it. Through/experience and hardships
the Commission has gradually formed a pretty definite idea as to
what constitutes a reasonable rate. In reading over various
types of rate cases, it has been found out that the Commission
in adjudicating the reasonableness of rates never failed to refer
to some of the most important factors in rate making, namely, (1)
distance, (2) cost of service^nd (3) value of service or
commodity. So it is well for us to take up each of the factors
and discuss them in the light of their reflections upon the

5reasonableness of a rate.
(1) Distance
The Commission scarcely took the distance as a sole con-
trolling element in determining what is a reasonable rate. In the
case of Kansas City Transportation Bureau of Commercial Club v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company et al 1 , said the
Commission, "Adoption of distance alone as a measure of the rates
from point o of origin to the primary market would be destructive
of competition in most of that territory", and the Commission
in the said case accordingly refused to take distance as a measur-
ing instrument. Again, said the Commission, in the case of
Receiver and Shippers Association of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati,
New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co., "Distance is only to
be taken as a standard when no other factors entered". The
question of distance as a factor in determining the reasonableness
of rates2 can be made clearer by studying the decisions on
matters of (a) differentials, (b) export rates, (c) import rates,
(d) group rates and advantage of location, and (e)"long and short
haul" section and competition.
(a) Differentials -A differential bears absolutely no
direct proportion to distance, in fact it bears roughly a reversed
proportion to it. In the case of P. P. William Co. v. Vicksburg
Shreveport & Pacific Railway Co.,-*- the Commission mentioned
that 'differentials diminish with increasing distance and vanish
1 16 I.C.C. Rep. 195. 2 See Classification Chapter I.
3 16 I.C.C. Rep. 482.

6when the mileage on which they are based becomes inconsiderable
in proportion to the total mileage from basing point to desti-
nation." In general, differentials are justified more on basis
of industrial conditions and competitions, than the element of
distance, though the latter never fails to play a part in charg-
ing a differential.
(b) Export rates.- That an export rate should be lower
than domestic rates on shipments to same points even for a longer
distance seemed to have been well recognized by the Commission.
In the case of Minneapolis Threshing Machine Company v. Chicago,
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co., 1 it was decided that a
rate of 37 1/2 cents per 100 pounds found to be reasonable
for the transportation of agricultural implements, in car loads,
from Minneapolis, to New York, when for export; but might not be
reasonable when for domestic. The Commission, however, insisted
upon the extension of an export rate to all shipments for export,
and making carriers under proper regulations be certain that the
traffic which obtained the lov/er rate was actually exported;
that is to say, instead of questioning the reasonableness of a
lower export rate, the Commission demand eel "the parity of its
application.
(c) Import rates.- The same recognition made ia export
rates was made in import rates by the Commission. Unjust dis-
crimination in rates against domestic shipments of plate glass in
favor of shipments was alleged in the case of Pittsburg Plate
1 16 I.C.C. Rep. 193.

7Glass Company v. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago, & St. Louis
Railway Company, 1 on the ground that rates on the former were
relatively higher than the inland rail proportion of the total
charge from the port of origin in a foreign country. While the
not
Commission sustained the allegation on some other grounds, it did/
fail to say that the circumstances and conditions in domestic
import shipments were different, and to charge a lower rate on
the part of defendant to meet the circumstances and conditions
not of their own creation, and which was reasonably necessary
for their purpose, did not necessarily form an unjust discrimina-
tion.
(d) Group rates and advantage of location,- The justifi-
cation of group rates largely depends upon facts and conditions
in a particular case. In the case of Nebraska State Railway Co.
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2 the Commision held that in
spite of the existence of competition for the purchase of coal
between Nebraska communities and communities in Wyoming and
Utah, no justification existed for the maintenance of a blanket-
rate on coal to all points on defendants' line in Nebraska. In
the case of Nobles Brothers Grocery Co. et al. v. Fort-Worth
& Denver City Railway Co. et al., 3
.
complaint was directed to
the claim that Amorillo, Texas, should enjoy the same rate with
the other Texas common points; the Commission held that Amorillo
situated 124 miles North and West of Quanah, the last common
point station of the defendant, did not properly fall within the
1 213 i.C.C. Rep. 87. 13 I.C.C. Rept. 349.
* 12 I.C.C. Rep. 242.

8competitive line, and the complainants* contention should not
be sustained. In many instances it is, however, well shown
that the Commission did recognize the justification and the ad-
vantage of group rates. Thus in the case of Chicago Lumber & Coal
Co. v. Tiago Southeastern Railway Co., said the Commission,
"Blanket or group rates in many cases especially with reference
to particular commodities are of great advantage to the public
without injustice to any interest, though there is necessarily
more or less disregard of distance and varying degrees of in-
equality? With such an affirmative recognition, the Commission
still did not fail to admit the existence of other conditions
that made a group rate unreasonable. Emphasis was especially
laid in connection with advantage of location. In the case Qif
Ccrperation Commission of the State of North Carolina v. Norfork
& We stern Railv/ay Co., ] the Commission said, that it was not
sufficient to justify the collection of unreasonable charges to
any point simply because the defendant had constructed a system
of rates on a blanket system. It went on to say that every city
was entitled to the advantage of its location and might not
lawfully be subjected to high freight charges merely because
carriers for reasons of convenience or otherwise, included it
in a number of other points in surrounding territory, which latter
points were not similarly situated. From this decision it is
clear that while the Commission did affirmatively take recogni-
tion of the justification of group rates, it did not allow them
to go so far as to ignore other conditions such as the advantage
-
19 I.C.C. Rep. 606

gof location.
(e) "Long and Short section" and competition. - A great
deal of discretion seemed to have been exercised by the Commission
in relieving carriers from the violation of the "long and short
haul" section of Commerce Act in the way of charging lower rates
for a longer haul than for a shorter one on the pretence of the
1
existence of competitions. In the case of Bovaird Supply Co. v
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., the general view of the
Commission as to what constituted a relief under. the "dissimilar
conditions" phrase was clearly stated there. It was stated that
the Commission viewed with disfavor the maintenance of a lower rate
for a longer haul than for a short one, included within the longer,
and the circumstance and conditions obtaining at the more distant
point, which were relied upon to justify it, must not only be clear-'
ly shown to be substantially dissimilar from those prevailing at
the neared point; but also to clearly exercise a potent or con-
trolling influence in making it lower rate. And it went on to • say
that if the influence of competition between points of production,
in commodities, between carriers, and in rates prevailing at the
further distant point, but not at the nearer one, controlled the
establishment of a lower rate to the former, it would constitute
such dissimilarity of circumstances as would justify the lower
rate for the longer haul; but the competition in commodities alone,
at the nearer point would not make circumstances there substantial- '
I
13 I. C. C. Rept. 56.
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ly similar to those at the further pfcint when the other com-
petitive influences and conditions also prevail, "still", it
was asserted, "the dissimilar circumstances which justify under
the long and short haul section a greater charge for a shorter
than for a longer haul would also prevent such rate from consti-
tuting an illegal preference or advantage" . In many other cases
the same view was expressed; and relieves invoked were sustained
or refused according to whether the facts of a case actually
constituted a dissimilar condition as the Commission might have
thought
.
(2) Cost of Service
The Commissioners frequently rejected to take cost of service
as a criterion for determining the reasonableness of rates.
They objected, first, because it was extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain the actual cost for handling a special
shipment and for each commodity separately; and secondly because
they believed that a method of apportionment as such, even be it
certain, would naturally " restrict within very narrow limits the
commerce in articles whose bulk was large as compared with their
value." While the Commissioners objected to make cost of service
a standard in measuring the reasonableness of rates, they, how-
ever, scarcely failed to refer it and discuss it, sometimes very
elaborately in case of being so demanded, as to its effects upon
the rate making. Thus in the case of New Albany Furniture Co.
v. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Co. et al., 1 complaint
1 13 I.C. C. Report 594.
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was made, against an advance in rates by the defendant; the
Commission, in condemning the unreasonableness of the advance
complained, mentioned as a ground of the judgment, that there was
no evidence that the rates advanced were less than the "cost of
service". And again in the case of Mountain Ice Co. v. Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 1 it was alleged that defendants'
rates on natural ice from points of harvest in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania to various consuming interstate destinations were
excessive. The question of cost of service of these was duly con-
sidered and discussed. The Commission admitted in this case, that
it would be no reason for requiring defendants to perform a
service, that is, the transportation of ice here, for a sum which
would not fairly compensate them; but the rates here were ex-
cessive even when the cost of service was taken into account. In
the case of Wilham H. Anthony v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway
2
Co. et al., a more definite statement in connection with the
cost of service was found in the opinion of the case. It was
asserted that the difference in the risk and cost of handling of
two different commodities ordinarily resulted in a substantial
difference in the rates. For a further study of the question of
cost of service as a factor in determining the reasonableness of
rates, cases involving the matter of (a) marine insurance, (b)
profit or earnings, (c) released rates, and (d) weight, will be
briefly treated in turn.
(a) Marine insurance.- The Commission did not allow
carriers to charge higher rates for the service of marine insurance,
1 15 I.C. C. Report 305. 2 14 I.C.C. Report 581.
3 Classification, Chapter I.
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unless they really took up all the responsibilities of an
insurer. In the case of Wyman, Portridge & Co. et al. v. Boston
& Marine Railroad Co. et al., 1 the defendants advanced their
rates from eastern points to Chicago and Minneapolis, 3 cents
for 100 pounds on first class and 1 l/2 cents on Rule 25, etc,
and these new rates included the cost of marine insurance. It
was held that the advanced ratds were unreasonable and should be
reduced because of the inclusion of cost of marine insurance,
unless the carriers were definitely made responsible for any loss
that any regular insurer would be responsible for. Same view
2
was held in a case between same parties in a later date.
(b) Profit or earning.- Question of profit or earning,
which is so closely related to the cost, is sometimes made a
ground by the Commission, against or in favor of carriers as
the case may be, in the inquiry of the reasonableness of rates.
In the case of the Johnson & Lariner Dry Goods Co. v. Atchison,
Topeka, Santa Fe Railway Co., it was held that a rate from Texas
producing points to Wichita of 50 cents per 100 pounds would
already be highly profitable to the carrier and the complained
rates of 96 cents to Wichita was therefore unreasonable. This
decision of the Commission was, however, failed to make a proof
of the statement, by investigations or otherwise, that the 50
cent rate would be highly profitable. This was in fact
nothing more than a surmise. Another somewhat same opinionate
~~I 213 I.C.C. Report 268. " 15 I.C.C. Report 577
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statement in connection with profit was made in the case of
Detroit Chemical Works v. Northern Central Railway Co., that a
long maintained rate was presumably profitable to the carriers,
and any increase of it was therefore unreasonable.
(c) Released rates.- The matter of released rate is none
the less a matter of risk, and ultimately, of cost. The validity
of a lower rate for releasing special risk of loss and a higher
rate for assuming it seemed to have been pretty well recognized
by the Commission. This matter was thoroughly investigated, and
definitely stated in re released rates.
1
It was concluded that
if a rate was conditioned upon the shipper assuming the risk
of loss due to causes beyond the carriers' control, the condition
was valid; but if conditioned upon shippers' assuming the entire
risk of loss, the condition was then void as against loss due to
the carriers' negligence or other conduct.
(d) Weight.- The Commission has recognized the rights of
carriers in order to facilitate the movement of business and to
secure economy of handling the traffic, to fix the weight of good
to be transported and assess charges accordingly; and also the
right to prescribe carload minimum weight for different commodi-
ties. But the rules of assessing charges by carrier on weight of
commodities, and minimum weights to different places had to be
subjected to the judgment of the Commission. In the case of
Topeka Banana Dealer Association et al. v. St. Louis & San-
Francisco Railroad Co. et al., 2 it was decided that the defend-
ants' rule of assessing charges on the weight of bananas at point
1 13 I.C.C. Report 550. 2 13 I.C.C. Report 620.
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of origin instead of in the weight of the fruit at destination
was not unjust and unreasonable, and further held that the fixing
of minimum weight at 20,000 pounds on shipments of bananas from
New Orleans to points west of Mississippi River, while assessing
a minimum weight of 18,000 pounds to Chicago & points east of
the river, did not result in undue discrimination; as it appeared
that such difference in minimum, was made to meet competition
through Baltimore, though the cost of hauling to these different
points might be the same.
(3) Value
The term "value" used here includes both value of service
and value of commodity. 1 They are distinctly two different
matters. The value of service to the shipper was defined from
the beginning by the Commission as the ability to reach a market
and to make his commodity a subject of commerce, or in a more
specific way of saying, the ability to roach a market at a profit;
while the value of commodity is the intrinsic value of the
article itself. Distinct as they are, they are nevertheless very
much shaded in each other. The value of commodity is always
one of the most important elements in determining the value of
service, and even sometimes their identities are hard to recog-
nize. As value of commodity is more or less a concrete matter,
and as the value of service cannot be exactly measured by any
better standard than the value of commodity, though it was
emphasized by the Commission that the value of commodity was
1
Classification, Chapter I.
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not the only consideration which entered into the value of
service, consequently the c omission has referred more often
to value of commodity than to value of service in determining
the reasonableness of rates.
In the result of investigation of released matters 1
there was concluded that a carrier might lawfully establish a
scale of charges applicable to a specific commodity and graduated
reasonably according to the value. In many cases a rate was
declared reasonable or unreasonable by comparing the rate of one
commodity with that of another, which is of different value with
the other. It was said in the case of Chicago Lumber & Goal
Company v Tioga Southwestern Railway Co., that the movement of
traffic was encouraged and increased when carriers adjusted
their rates to mercantile interests, but they were not obliged
and also not allowed in adjusting their rates to equalize the
value of commodities in their final destination. In the case
2
of Lang Brewing Co. v Chicago, Burlington & '^uincy R.R. Co.
it was decided that an exaction of second class rate of fl.45
per 100 pounds on v/ooden bungs, l.cl. found to be unreasonable
to the extent that it had exceeded fourth class rate of 92 cents
on articles of similar character and greater value. Again in the
case of Elemner & Thomas v Chicago, St. Paul, Llinneapolis & Omaha
Ry. Co. a reparation was allowed on account of certain shipments
of stock-cattle which had moved at the beef cattle rate, because
1 13 I. CO. Report 550.
J 18 I.C .C .Report 3376 14 I. C.C. Report 525
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the value of the two coninodit ies are not of the sane. The rates
of 27 cents, 0.1. & 45 cents l.c.l. in walnut veneer from Xansas
City to Chicago were pronounced excessive in the case of Penrod
Walnut & Veneer Company v Chicago
,
3urlington & "uincy ?..R.Co.
simply on the consideration of the value of the article.
j'rom the fact that in so man;; cases, rates were decided
reasonable or otherwise according to the value of commodity, it
might he well to infer that the value of commodity was accepted
"by the commission as a better criterion in measuring the reason-
ableness of rates.
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CHAPTER III
Services and Privileges
We have discussed service relative to its cost in the
last chapter of its effects upon the general rate-making. The
servicos to he discussed in this chapter are more or less of
special character, and, in general, do not reflect upon the gen-
eral rate-making but only give rise to additional charges, if
any. Privileges here are meant those special arrangements made
either formally or informally between the carriers and shippers
which are usually detrimental to the carrier and invariably bene-
ficial to the shipper on account of the existence of some special
conditions justifying the carrier's sacrifice. These privileges
are usually accorded by carriers as a matter of advertising,
especially true of those privileges to passengers. As these
services and privileges are prone to be abused, so as to give
rise to undue discriminations, it will be the work of this
chapter to study their legality in the eyes of the Commission.
Various kinds of servicos and privileges will be studied in the
order of the classification . First, we come to a number
accorded
of services and privileges/to shippers, that is, in connection
with freight. They are as follows: (1) Compression in transit,
(2) Feeding in transit, (3) Milling in transit, (4) Stoppage in
transit, (5) Lightering, (6) Track-Storage, (7) Unloading cars,
(8) Telegraph service, (9) ^consignment privilege.
(1) Compression in transit.- The Commission did not inter-
1 Chapter I.
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fere with the carriers' policy of allowing compression in tran-
sit to their shippers, but did insist upon the parity of the
allowance. In the case of iiuskogee Commercial Club et al v
Missouri, ITansas & Texas Ry. Co., it was stated that when a rail-
road company declared policy which allowed compression of cotton
in ttansit at the nearest point, it could not vary that rule so
as t o give certain shippers the opportunity to avoid it and thereby
receive an advantage which was not given to shippers generally.
(2) Feeding in transit.- With respect to feeding- in—transit
privilege, tho Commission had prescribed its lawful charge and
ordered the common carriers to be in conformity with the pres-
cription. During the four years only one case complained the
violation of the Commission's order; and the feeding-in-transit
tariff of the charged carrier ordered to be corrected.
(3) Hilling in transit.- As in the case of compression
in transit, the Commission did not condemn tho milling-in-transit
privilege at all, but impose some definite duties to both car-
riers and shippers as well> and require the carrier and shipper
tc collect and pay as what it was published in the tariff. In re
2transit, it was definitely concluded that the Commission did
not condemn the transit privileges, hut held that the responsi-
bility for safeguarding and policing the transit privileges, to
the end that the lawfully published rate should be collected,
rested entirely upon carriers; and that shippers, however,
would not be excused in any case when they defeated published
rates by any abuse of transit privileges. It was asserted as
1 12 I. C.C. Report 312. 218 I .0 .C .Report 280.
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a dictum that" the duty of shippers to pay published rates is
precisely the same as the duty of collecting such rates." This
was sought to place the liability of descriminati on not only
to carriers but to shippers as well.
(3) Stoppage in transit.- A reasonable charge for an in-
cidental service to stoppage in transit is usually allowable, and
the legality of allowing stoppage- in transit, as in other kinds
of transit, has never been questioned. In the case of Indianapolis
freight Bureau v Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry.Co. 1
the defendants had issued tariffs allowing stoppage in transit at
Indianapolis for fabrication of structural iron, and charge of
1 1/2 cents per pound, to be made for the incidental service; and
this tariff complained of was held by the Commission was without
injustice.
(5) Lighterage.- During the four years considered only
one case involved this matter of lighterage was well represented
in the case of Barrett Manufacturing Company v Central R.R.
Company of Hew Jersey. 2 The Commission in that case denied
the complainant's demand for reparation for lightering its own
merchandise across Hew York Harbor because (1) there was no
tariff rule then' in effect authorizing allowances to shippers
for lightering their own shipment, and (2) the mere fact that
the defendant could not lighter the shipments as promptly .as the
special exigencies for the complainant's business required gave
the complainant no right to do the service itself and then demand
^11 I .C .C .Report 370.
-17 * * 454
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compensation for it. This decision, though did not show as the
possible legal charge for lightering service, if done by carrier,
in fact, this was not so called for by the case, did give us
the inference that the Commission would require the carrier to do
the lightering service for shippers, even in case of being so
needed.
(6) Track-storage. The privilege of track storage has very
often been abused that Prof. Johnson considered the abuse of the
use of track-storage as one of the factors in causing the terrible
car famine of 1906 and 1907. The Commission, while it took no
definite steps against the track-storage privilege, did dis-
courage shippers from indulging in the use of it. In the case
of Wilson Produce Company v Pennsylvania R. R. Co. , the Commis-
sion sustained the legality of defendants' tariff charging a
rather large sum for track storage after the expiration of 48
hours' free time
,
by saying that the law did not require a car-
rier to give its cars and tracks under any terms for use as
warehouses or places of business, and that a carrier, after al-
lowing a reasonable time for unloading cars, might impose such
charges for further detention as would lead to the speedy release
of its equipment.
(7) Loading and Unloading Cars.- The service of loading and
unloading cars both in carload and package shipments are usually
done by shippers themselves. Whenever carriers give assistance to
loading and unloading cars, in case of being so desired, carriers
reserve the right to charge what it costs. Such attitude was
taken by the Commission. In the case of Shultz-Hansen Co. v

22
Southern Pacific Oo.^ it was declared that it was not unlawful
for carriers to assoss a reasonable charge for loading or unload-
ing, or for assisting in loading or unloading car load freight;
and further, that the carrier must have the right to unload
carload shipments and release its equipment v/hon consignee had
neglected to unload within the free time provided in carrier's
tariff, and that carrier might not be required to perform that
service without reasonable compensation therefor. In the case
of Wholesale Fruit & Produce Association v Atchison, Topeka,
& Santa Pe Railway Go. the complainant asked the Commission for
an order to compell carriers at Chicago to furnish assistance
in unloading shipments in packages; .^nd the Commission denied to
comply by declaring that there was no good reason why ordinary
package freight , which was loaded and unloaded upon the team
track, should not be handled into and out of the car by shipper
in the same manner that bult freight was; and further that it
appeared in many instances these fruits and vegetables were
allowed to remain in the car for a considerable time after its
arrival, and were delivered by the consignee from the car itself
to the purchaser; now if the order as asked was issued, it would
impose a hardship upon the carrier to require it to furnish
help for the unloading of the car at whatever time the shipper
might require such services. Prom these two decisions it is well
to infer that a charge for loading and unloading cars by carriers
are legal so long as it is not excessive, and that such service
is not obligatory unless so provided in contracts.
1 18 I. C.C. Report
, 234 2 17 I .C .C .Report 596.

23
(8) Telegraph Service. - There is no reason to give free
telegraph service by carrier to shipper for the transaction of
"business which belongs to the latter. It was said by the Commis-
sion in the case of Kehoe & Co. v Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Ry. Co. ot al,^ that the Commission would not impose on
carrier duty of telegraphing to consignor in the event that ship-
ment was refused by consignee or latter could not be found.
(9) Reconsignment Privilege.- The reconsignment privilege lile
other privileges is purely a matter of carrier's policy, its
legality has never been questioned. The question often coming
up to the Commission was not the legality of the privilege
itself, but the legality of charges for the privilege. In the
2
case of 3eclnnan Lumber Co. v St . Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. et al
complainant questioned the legality of a reconsigning charge of
$5 per car as applied on four car loads of lumber from Thornton,
Arkansas, originally consigned to East St. Louis, and diverted to
Granite City, Illinois; the Commission held that the reconsigning
charge assessed on the shipments from Thornton, Ark. was made
in accordance with 'the published tariffs, and no evidence having
been adduced to show that such charge was of itself unreasonable.
In carrier's tariffs the period for the extension of this priv-
ilege is often provided. After the expiration of the periods
provided, no longer will this privilege be extended, but a reg-
ular charge is made for any further consignment. An extention
of the privilege after the expiration of the period was not
~1
?14 I. C.C. Report 555. c 14 I. C.C. Report 552.

24
allowed and considered discriminatory by the Commission. Such
was declared by the Commission in the case of Sunnyside Coal
Uining Co. v Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co.-1-
So much was for the services and privileges in connection
with freight; now we come to consider some of the privileges ac-
corded to the passengers. There are only two privileges, namely,
fl) free passes, (2) party rates.
(1) Free passes.- Classes of persons that are given free
passes are expressly enumerated in the congress statute. To
allow free passes to persons other than enumerated is , under
whatever conditions, considered illegal by the Commission. In
re railroad-telegraph contracts, the Commission affirmatively
declared that a railroad company or system of roads could not
lawfully contract, in consideration of free telegraph service
over wires beyond its own right of way, to furnish free passes
to the officials, employees, laborers, of a telegraph company
concerned. Again in re the free transportation of newspaper
employees on special newspaper trains,^ the Commission said that
when trie Congress has expressly enumerated special classes of
persons that might be exempted from the operation of general
provisions in a law, this Commission could not enlarge the
exempted classes by mere construction and include in them persons
not thus expressly named in the statute itself.
a.
(2) Party rates. In the matter of party rate tickets* it
was concluded by the Commission that party rate tickets could
not be limited to particular classes of persons, but must be open
to the general publ i c
.
^16 I.C.:. report 558. | 12 I .C .C .Report 10
3-2 I .C . C .Report 15 12 " 05
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CHAPTER IV
Improper Practices of Carriers
As we have seen that practically all the special services
and privileges discussed in the last chapter are accepted in most oi
cases as lawful. We now come to discuss something which are
prima facie illegal, that is, the improper practices of carriers.
Such practices prevailed in railroad today are comparatively
much less in number and still less in vogue, because of the
strict regulation of the government and vigilant supervision
of the public. But still there survived not a few of them,
j'rom the Commission's cases we have found complaints against all
kinds of improper or unfair practices of carriers, the more im-
portant of which are: (l) extra-allowances, (2) embargoes, (3)
rebates, (4) undercharges, (5) misstatement of agent, (6) pooling
of traffic.
(1) Extra-allowances.- These extra-allowances include the
deviation from published tariff, rendering services to some part-
icular shippers without charge, and undue return for some
shippers' service and so forth. Such are all considered illegal
by the Commission. In the case of LaSalle & Bureau County Hail-
road Co. v Chicago & northwestern Railway Co. 1 it was adjudged
that when rates were filed and published, carriers must abide
thereby, and that no allowance of any kind not specified in tariffs'
could lawfully be paid. As charges for all kinds of service dis-
cussed in last chapter are in most cases published in carrier's
1 13 I .C .C .Report 610
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tariffs, in fact required to "be published, by the Commission,
the practice of rendering services to shippers without charge
would be illegal too, just by inference to the decision just
quoted. In regard to undue return for shippers service an illus-
tration of its being illegal could be found in the case of Traffic
Eureau Merchants Exchange of 3t. Louis v Chicago, Burlington &
i
Q,uincy R.R. Co. et al. It was decided there that the payment
of an elevation allowance of 1 cent per 100 pounds to an elevator,
who himself was a shipper was undue and therefore illegal.
(2) Embargoes.- An embargo against one commodity in a time
of congestion is usually not illegal, but an embargo refuses
transportation facilities to some establishments while according
such facilities to their competitors is evidently discriminatory.
So was in the case of Rogers & Co. v Philadelphia b Heading
Railway Company, 2 and the embargo was condemned illegal.
(3) Rebates.- The practice of rebating had been seriously
condemned by the public from the public. "What constitutes a
rebate", used to be decided by court and now by Commission. A
rebate under whatever guise is always illegal. In re allowances
3to elevators by the Union Pacific R. R. Company, the Commission
declared that an allowance made to a shipper who furnished eleva-
tor service under an arrangement with a carrier is a rebate and
therefore unlawful.
(4) Undercharges.- An undercharge may be made either thru
mistake or by intention. In former cases a carrier is innocent
has to suffer the loss of difference for his own fault, and in
I 14 I. C.C. Report 317.
* 12 " 308
3 12 rt 85
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the latter it is a form of rebate ind liable for illegality.
During the period of four years no ease has cor.io up for complain-
ing an undercharge in the latter form; and only once did the
commission criticize an ambiguous and indefinite tariff, which
led to an undercharge complained of in the case of Old Dominion
Smelting Co. v Pennsylvania Railroad Go.* As to the undercharge
through mere mistake of carrier's agent , the Commission rather
took an indifferent view. In the case of Palls & Co. v Chicago
2Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. 4" the Commission said that
the Commission was without authority to enter Gin order requiring
a shipper to make good an undercharge , but shippers must under-
stand their liability under law for the failure or refusal to
pay the published rates.
(5) Misstatement of Agent. - Looking from the face, a
misstatement of agent is certainly a blunder that a carrier
has to be liable for, in case some injury done to a shipper as a
result of the misstatement; but curious enough the commission
took a different view. In the case of Ohio Iron & Lletal Co.
3
v '7abash R. R. Co. the Commission said that an erroneous
statement of defendant's agent resulting in the shipment moving
over the lines of defendants at a rate higher than in force via
another route did not entitle the complainant to an award of
teparation. This judgment really imposed upon a shipper the dut
to look out for his own interest, instead of holding the carrier
responsible for proper routing and other things of the kind.
\ 17 I.CO. Report 309
| 15 " ,T 269o is » n 299
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(6) Pooling of traffic. - The practice of pooling of freight
has long been condemned with severity by the public from the,
beginning* and it is exprossly prohibited in the fifth section
of the Coramerct Act. Its trace of survival could hardly be
found today, but the shipping public has still the suspicion,
and often times alleges the existence of such practices against
carriers. The Commission, however, often found such allegations
as mere presumption and even groundless, and so just dismissed
it for lack of evidence. In the case of Commercial Club,
Traffic Bureau, of Salt Lake City, Utah, v Atchison, Topeka &
Sante Pa Railway Co. 1 complaint alleged that defendants pool
traffic from the east to Utah points; the Commission dismissed
the complaint for there was no record contained proof of that
all egation.
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CHAPTER V
Equipments and Facilities
Railroads, doing business of public transportation, are
obliged to cater the public the full and equitable use of their
equipments, and facilities, for accommodations and movement of
traffic. The failure to do so on the part of carriers is
oftentimes condemned as improper unless it can be justified by
conditions. On the other hand the railroads reserve the perfect
right of assessing charges for the use of their equipments and
facilities; but the charges must not be unreasonable or oppress-
ive. The question of proper descharge of duty inherent to the
railroad business and its right to fair compensation is within
the jurisdiction of the Commission. The subject matters in con-
nection with equipment, and facilities, to be studied in this
chapter are as follows: (1) Car supplies, (2) Oar shortage,
(3) Elevation, (4) Stations, (5) Terminal, (6) Switches.
(1) Car supplies.- The question of car supplies is largely
a question of distribution of cars which altogether is not an
easy one. The methods of destributing cars are different in
different railroads, and the basis upon which cars distributed
has got to be different for different commodities. To pass a
judgment on the propriety of such a varied subject is naturally
to be hard, and the judgment is prone to be arbitrary. The matter
of equitable distribution of cars, and of a basis for the distri-
bution was somewhat discussed in the case of Hillsdale Coal &
Coke Company v Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 1 The complainant there
119 I. C.C. Report 356.
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capacity
contended that the physical /of a coal mine alone should be a
fair and sound basis for rating coal mines for car distribution;
but the defendants added to the physical capacity of a coal mine
its commercial capacity, tested by the shipments made from it
during the preceding twelve months , and divided the number by
two. The Commission in that case sustained the latter, by saying
that the utmost obligation of a carrier under the law was to
equip itself with sufficient cars to meet the requirements of a
mine for actual equipment; and that it was no real concern to the
carrier whatwere the physical possibilities of a mine in the way
of daily output except as that factor might afford some measure
of what its actual shipments would be. As to fair proportion
of cars to shippers, the defendant in the same case contended
that, so long as the petitioner received all the cars it was
entitled to, it had no right to complain because other operators
received an undue proportion of cars. To this contention the
Commission answered that the law not only gave the shipper a
right to a justly rotable use of the facilities of an interstate
carrier but the assurance also that no other shipper should fare
ratably better at the hands of the carrier. Here the Commission
not only required the carrier to give full use of its equipment
as demanded but also prevented him from unduo proportioning cars
to shippers as it saw fit.
(2) Car shortage.- This is closely associated with car
supplies. This subject has been elaborately discussed and thoroly
investigated by the American Railway Association, and by the
Commission as well. In re car shortage and other insufficient
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transportation facilities, 1 the Commission discussed the matter
and proposed remedies which for our present study, that is, from
the legal point of view, are rather unconcerned; so they need not
be reproduced in this place. In general the Commission would
not consider the complaints for insufficient supply of cars during
the time of car shortage so long the carriers had done their
best to appropriate their cars at hand equally to the demanding
shippers. The carriers' rule that in time of car shortage, cars
would be furnished to the various shippers in proportion to the
amount of cars demanded and actual cars at hand, and the so-called
"crop-holding rule", were upheld by the Commission.
(3) Elevation.- In re allov^ances to elevators, 2 it was
stated by the Commission that the law clearly recognized elevation
as a facility which the carrier might provide, and this authorized
the carrier to grant grain elevation at destination, subjected
only to the restriction imposed by the act that elevation, like
any other facility offered by the carrier to shipper, must be
open to all on equal and reasonable terms. It was required by the
Commission as to the elevation charges that a carrier when he
saw fit to offer elevation facilities to his shipper, he must
publish the charge for the same is tariff.
(4) Stations.- The obligation on the part of carrier to
provide station facilities at a given point along the line of
a railroad may arise under the terms of the charter of a company
~"T
12 I.C.C. Report 561. 2 12 I.C.C. Report 85.
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or may be imposed by statute, and some authority assert that
the duty exists also at common law. The Commission, under the
act to regulate commerce, may have the power to impose a carrier
this obligation too; but the Commission has rather been very care-
ful to exercise its power in this respect, unless conditions
clearly has indicated that the interest of the general public
in the locality involved are materially impaired by the lack of
such facilities. Thus in the case of Jones et al. v. St. Louis
& San Francisco Railroad Co., 1 the complainant requested the
Commission's order to compel the defendant to reestablish a
station at a place demanded; the Commission refused to issue the
order as pleaded because of lack of sufficient ground that the
public interest had been seriously impaired. Same refusal on
the same ground was again made by the Commission in the case
of Eddleman et al. v. Middleland Valley Railroad Co., 2 the con-
dition required by the Commission for justifying an establishment
of a new station is rather indefinite, because it is largely
a matter of opinion as to how far a public interest impaired
may constitute a condition that would justify the Commission to
require a carrier to establish a new station as the public
interest demanded this vagueness of condition only serves the
Commission to evade or shrink from the exercise of its power
questioned.
(5) Terminal.- In spite of the fact that in this country
the terminal of a railroad may not be owned by the railroad it-
self but by some private terminal company, the terminal facilities
-
12 I. C. C. Report 144. 2 13 I. C. C. Report 103.
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must open to the public use on equal terms as other facilities.
It was declared by the Commission in the case of Carl Eichen-
burg v. Southern Pacific Railway Co. et al. that the Terminal
Company was a part and parcel of the system engaged as a whole
in the transportation of commerce, and that all the terminal
facilities could not be exempted from the regulating authority
of the Commission. In attempting to secure equal use of termin-
al facilities, the Commission, in the same case, prohibited the
Terminal Company to make contracts with shippers for special use
of the terminal facilities. "If the Terminal Company", said the
Commission, may make a contract with a shipper of cotton-seed
products and give him thereby certain privileges which it does
not give to other shippers of the same commodities, it may also
make similar contrasts with regard to cotton or other products.
A sanction of this contract would in effect sanction a device
to evade the law."
(6) Switches.- Switches are in the main loading and un-
loading facilities. It is a ruling of the Commission that
switches, like other facilities, must be open to all shippers on
equal terms. As to proper charges for the use of switches, and
the requirements of switching facility to the shipping public,
the opinion of the Commission was well expressed in the case of
Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co., 2 and in the case of Reiter, Curtic & Hill v. New
York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad Company, 3 respectively.
~~I
214 I.C.C. Report 250. * 18 I.C.C. Report 310.
2
19 I.C.C. Report 290.
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In the former case, said the Commission, "A charge of ^2.50 per
car exacted for delivering and receiving carload to and from
industries located upon spurs and sidetracks within carriers 1
switching limits is unlawful, when such carload freight is moving
incidently to a system-line haul; charge is not unlawful when
such car load freight is moving incidently to a foreign haul" -
an exactly same decision was rendered in the case of Pacific
Coast Jobbers* & Manufacturers' Association v. Southern Pacific
Co.l In the latter case, that is the Reiter case, the Commissicn
said that unloading facilities that were ample to meet the
general requirements of a commodity need not be enlarged by a
carrier to meet the special requirements of a single shipper on a
given occasion. In this connection it may be well to mentioned
here that by section I of the amended act to regulate commerce the
Commission is authorized to order the construction and mainten-
ance upon reasonable terms of "a switch connection" with any
lateral branch line of railroad or "private side track which may
be constructed to connect with its railroad, where such connection
is reasonably practicable and can be put in with safety and will
furnish sufficient business to justify the construction and
maintenance of the same.
1
18 I.C.C. Report 333.
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CHAPTER VI
Interline relations
In this chapter we are not going to discuss all possible
interline relations as the title might so suggest, but will con-
fine oursevles only to such relations as would reflect the various
kinds of through rates, not so much in the light of their
reasonableness, as of the principles developed and rule fixed by
the Commission for the making of such rates. The subject-matters
to be discussed in this connection are as follows: (1) Combina-
tion rates, (2) Joint rates, (3) Proportional rates, and (4)
Division of rates.
(1) Combination rates.- It has been a well established rule
that a through rate must not be higher than the combination rates
of two or more local rates. This rule has been so well established
and sticked to by the Commission that even strong competitive
situation could not be invoked for relief from the operation of
the rule. The exact situation involved in the case of Morgan v.
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. et al. 1 There, the princi-
pal defendant established an especially low rate, because of
competition, upon shipments from Crowder City, Indian Territory,
to Kansas City; and the defendant's had established a through rate
applicable to shipments from other points in Indian Territory
to Kansas City, which shipments moved through Crowder City,
complainants alleged that the combination rates from points of
origin of such shipments to Crowder and thence to Kansas City
were lower than the through rate from points in Indian Territory
1
12 I.C.C. Report 525.
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to Kansas City. Upon the facts presented and the allegation
entered, the Commission concluded with a statement that a carrier
might, because of commercial conditions or competition, establisha\
a given point an especially low rate, but whenever it was such as
to the effect that, through the presence of this special rate
an existed through rate was made higher than the combination
of local rates; this rate must be illegal. Many decisions con-
demning a through rate were rendered by the Commission by apply-
ing the same rule referred to
.
(2) Joint rates.- Joint rates are rates applicable to
shipments over a through rate formed by an arrangement between
connecting carriers. Joint through rates are usually lower than
the sum of the locals between two points. "In general" said the
Commission, in the case of Lanning-Harris Coal & Grain Co. v
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. et al., 1 "Joint through rates are
lower than the sum of the locals between two points, and obvious-
ly there can very seldom by any transportation reason why such
should not be the case".
The above quotation may make it clear as to what a joint
rate should be, but does not bring out at all as to under what
conditions could a joint rate be established. A hint to this
latter point is found in a statement given by the Commission
in the case of Cardiff Coal Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway Co. 2 It may be laid down", stated the Commission in
that case, "as a general rule admitting of no qualification that
a manufacturer or merchant who has traffic to move and is ready
to pay a reasonable rate for the service has the right to have it
I 13 I.cTc. Report 154. 2 13 I.C.C. Report 460.
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moved and to have reasonable rates established for the movement,
regardless of the fact the revenues of the carrier may be reduced
by reason of his competition with other shippers in the distant
markets, and he has the right also to have the benefit of through
routes and joint rates to such distant markets, if no through
routes already exist".
(3) Proportional rates.- Proportional rates are rates which
are maintained for a shipment from the junction point of a through
route to a local point beyond the through route. The rates are so
made as to be in proportion with the through rate instead of to
be the same as the local rate. In no one case it was mentioned by
the Commission as what a proportional rate should be, in fact it
does not need to, because the name already suggests what it would
be
.
(4) Division of rates.- Owing to the existence of various
kinds of through routes and through rates, it naturally gives
rise to the question of division rates between connecting
carriers. Division of rates is usually, but not invariably based
upon mileage. In the case of Star Grain & Lumber Co. et al. v
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al., 1 . "In fixing a
division", said the Commission, "between carriers of joint rates,
it is the duty of the Commission to take into consideration all
the Circumstances, conditions, and equities fairly affecting their
§everal interests, and precludes the idea that the division must
be adjusted on a mileage or any other fixed basis". Again in
the case of Birmingham Packing Co. v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co.
14 I.C.C. Report B64.
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et al.,*- it was held that upon the facts of the case, that
considering the terminal charges of the receiving and the deliver-
ing lines and the ferry charges of the intermediate line, the rate
should be divided upon a mileage basis; "but this conclusion",
emphasized the Commission, "should not be taken as implying that
all joint rates should necessarily be divided upon a mileage
basis". From the above two somewhat similar decisions, it may
be well to infer that the division of rates has to be based upon
mileage if no extra-conditions existed.
1
12 I.C.C. Report 500.
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CHAPTER VII
Jurisdiction of Commission
The Jurisdiction of the Commision was comprehensive even
before the passage of Act of 1910. Besides the jurisdiction
expressly prescribed in the Commerce Act and the Amended Act of
1906, the Commission was gaining field of control through inter-
pretation of the acts so, in order to have a comprehension idea
of how wise the jurisdiction of the Commission was covered before
the year 1910, it is not enough to refer only to the Acts, but
also to consult with at the same time, the cases where the juris-
diction of the Commission questioned.
Under the heading of "Jurisdiction of the Commission" we
are not going to enumerate all the possible matters that come
within the jurisdiction of the Commission, by quoting the Acts or
even reproducing them, but will only concern ourselves in this
connection, such jurisdiction of the Commission as questioned in
the cases coming up to the Commission and not expressly given in
the Acts. The more important questions with reference to the
jurisdiction are as follows: (1) Jurisdiction over Alaska, (2)
State Railroad Commission, (3) Top Line, (4) Terminal Company,
(5) Regulation of services of carriers, (6) Establishment
of Station and (7) Fixing basis for division of rates.
(1) Jurisdiction over Alaska.- "The district of Alaska",
said the Commission in re jurisdiction over rail and water
carriers operating in Alaska, 1 "is not a territory of the United
States in the sense in which that phrase is used in the Act to
19 I.C.C. Report 81.
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regulate commerce as amended and the Commission has therefore
no authority or jurisdiction over carriers engaged in transporta-
tion of passengers or property within the district of Alaska".
(2) State Railroad Commission.- While State Commission
has effective control over railroad matters within the state, but
it has to give way before the Interstate Commerce Commission in
dealing matters reflecting interstate traffic. "Upon general
principles of " , declared the Commission in the case of
E. E. Saunders and T. E. Welles v. Southern Express Co., 1 the
action of a State Commission in fixing rates on State traffic
must be treated with all due respect, but the Commission has never
felt itself Eound to accept a State-made rate as a necessary
measure of an interstate rate".
(3) Tap Line.- The so-called tap line is given cognizance
in the Commerce Act, and therefore a common carrier under the
jurisdiction of the Commission; but the Commission was rather
particular in the interpretation as to what is a tap line. Thus
is the case of Star Grain & Lumber Co., v. Atchison, Topeka
g
& Santa Fe Railway Co. "The mere interposition", said the
Commission, "between a mill and a carrier of a paper railroad
incorporation that calls itself a common carrier and complies with
the act in those respects, but is owned by the mill or its
proprietors, does not meet the requirement of the Commission of
a so-called tap line".
(4) Terminal Company.- Terminal company in this country is
always a separate entity itself, not itself engaged in trans-
portation business; and therefore may not come under the juris-
1 18 I.C.C. Report 415. 7 l.r..n. p» Pnrt, 538
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diction of the Commission. The Commission, however, holds it
does. Thus in the case of Salvoy Process Co. v. Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 1 the Commission declared that
a Terminal Company was only part and parcel of the system engaged
as a whole in the transportation, and to the extent such
commerce is interstate, the Commission has jurisdiction to super-
vise and control it within statutory limits.
(5) Regulation of services of carriers.- It is not enumerat 1
ed in the fifteenth section of Commerce Act all the services of
carriers that may be regulated by the Commission. It has to be
interpreted by the Commission as the cases coming up as to what
are within the competence of the Commission to regulate. In the
2
case of Rail & River Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,
the Commission said that Section 15 of the Act was to be read in
the widest possible sense; and that it brought with the juris-
diction of the Commission all the regulations and practices of
carriers under whidh they offer their services to the shipping
public and conduct their transportation. And so in the case of
Wholesale Fruit & Produce Association v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Co. et al., the Commission declared that rules
or regulations prescribing who shall load and unload cars of
freight were rules or regulations affecting rates, and were,
therefore subject to the control of Commission under the fifteenth
section.
(6) Establishment of Stations.- The Commission refused to
assume the power of ordering carriers to establish new stations
1 14 I.C.C. Report 246. 2 14 I.C.C. Report 86.
2 I 4 I.C.C. Rftnrvpf. 4.1 n,
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as condition required. "The Commission", said the Commission,
is not the proper forum to which to appeal for the enforcement
either of a charter, or common law obligations which
might impose carriers to establish new stations as conditions
required"
.
(7) Division of rates.- As division of rates is something
incidental to the establishment of through routes and joint
rates, and as the Commission was authorized to establish through
routes by the amended act, the power to fix basis for division
of rates is clearly within the competence of the Commission.
So was it asserted by the Commission in the case of Star Grain
& Lumber Co. et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
et al.l "The fixing of a division", said the Commission is
that case, "between carriers of joint rates ordered to be es-
tablished, is the duty of the Commission as implied in the
Section 15".
CONCLUSION
From such a general survey, however general as it is,
as we just had, one may get a fair idea of what are some of the
factors that play parts in rate making, and consequently the
reasonableness of rates; and what are the practices and of
carriers that are usually condemned by the Commission, and what
are not; and also of how extensive is the jurisdiction of the
Commission over railway matters. However, it is well to remind
that conditions are changing as time goes on, and the opinion
-
14 I.C.C. Report 364.
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and policy of the Commission to certain particular matters might
change also with the changing conditions; though some of the
general and well established doctrines will still stand the waves
of the time. All these cases coming up to the Commission are
decided upon the facts and conditions of a particular case instead
of upon a rigid, fixed rule. So was acknowledged by the Commissio:;.
itself in the case of Kansas City Hay Dealers* Association v.
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. et al., 1 and in many other cases
the Commission said, in that case, that the question of reasonable-
ness and even of legality is always one of fact; and each case
must stand upon its own record. Such an evading statement may
annihilate the whole significance of this thesis; but the writer
cannot help to state it as such, because it is a statement of
facts too.



